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With the recent enactment of the Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth) racial
vilification is now unlawful throughout Australia. Based on an examination of
media treatment of the legislation during the long period that it was before
Parliament,' one could be mistaken for reaching two erroneous conclusions.
First, the paramount dilemma posed by the enactment of racial hatred laws is
the danger which such laws pose for freedom of expression. Second, there is
no Australian 'experience' to speak of when it comes to racial hatred laws,
and so, analysis is by necessity, abstract and opironated.
In fact, neither of these two conclusions is justifiable, and both reflect the
serious limitations of the debate over the legitimacy of racial vilification laws
which has taken place in Australia in recent times. Constructive analysis of
racial hatred laws has been seriously hampered because of the domination of
the debate by superficial talk about 'free speech', a preoccupation which is
exacerbated by the abstract, decontextualised nature of much of the analysis.
The relationship between freedom of expression and racial hatred laws is an
BA LLB (UNSW), LLM (Manitoba); Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of
Wollongong. This article is based on research supported by a grant from the Australian
Research Council. Special thanks to Ursula Armstrong for research assistance and to
Tamsin Clarke and the Griffith Law Review's referees for comments on an earlier
draft.
The Racial Hatred Bill was originally introduced into the House of Representatives on
10 November 1994. The Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth) received assent on 15
September 1995.
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entirely appropriate topic for discussion. However, debate should not be
allowed to stagnate at the po)int of a purely theoretical assessment of
legitimacy, but must be directed to the importance practical question of
effectiveness. This article is designed to contribute to a broadening of the
terms of the debate about the role of legal regulation as a strategy of anti-
racism - with specific reference to laws which proscribe the public incitement
of racial hatred - by drawing on critical and empirical perspectives which, to
(late, have not figured prominently in the Australian debate. A constructive
debate over the merits of racial hatred laws must move beyond the dominant
rights discourse of liberalism and towards an inclusion of other philosophical
and theoretical perspectives, and accurate consideration of relevant law
reform precedents. These additions to the framework of debate will assist in
moving examination of racial vilification laws to the next, equally inportant
stage: an assessment of the relative merits of different models of legal
intervention.
Part II of the article will provide an overview of existing racial vilification
laws in Australia, with particular emphasis on New South Wales, where
racial vilification laws have been in operation since 1989. This discussion is
designed to fill in one of the most obvious and unnecessary gaps in the debate
over racial hatred laws - a failure to draw on relevant practical experience.
Part III will critically examine free speech-based opposition to racial hatred
laws by identifying several flaws commonly found in the arguments of
opponents to legislative intervention, and will outline an alternative theoretical
framework for analysing racial hatred laws - a perspective which takes
seriously the experience of victims of racial vilification, including the real
harm associated with racism in this form. In Part IV, I argue that a
reformulation of the terms of tie debate along these lines does not necessarily
lead to an unequivocal endorsement of all forms of racial hatred laws. Rather,
it offers a useful framework for undertaking a productive assessment as to
which forms of legal intervention are most likely to meet the needs of victims
of racial vilification. Based on an assessment of the evidence which is
currently available in Australia, I conclude that a conciliation-based human
rights model appears to offer the most an effective regulatory response to a
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forn otf racism, which, if not seriously confronted, will continue to undermine
Australia's claim to genuine multiculturalism.
II. Racial Vilification Legislation in Australia
Since 1989 racial vilification legislation has been enacted in New South
Wales, 2 the Australian Capital Territory, 3 Western Australia, 4 and in a limited
fonn, in Queen-lWand. 5 There is considerable variation between the different
statutes, in terms of scope, and form of regulation.
The Western Australian Criminal Code 1913 contains a number of racial
incitement offences, introduced in 1990, which deal specifically with
possession and publication of material. Section 77 states that:
Any person whu-
a) possesses written or pictorial material that is threatening or
abusive; and
b) intends that material to be published, distributed or displayed
whether by that person or another person; and
c) intends hatred of any racial group to be created, promoted or
increased by the publication, distribution or display of the
material,
- Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, ss.20C-20D (amended in 1989).
Discrimination Act 1991, ss.66-67.
Criminal Code 1913, ss.77-80 (amended in 1990).
5 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, s.126. Draft legislation (the Racial and Religious
Vilification Bill) was tabled in the Victorian Parliament in 1992 but lapsed with the
election of a Liberal Government.
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is guilty of a crime and is liable to imprisonment for 2 years.6
The legislation was originally introduced in October 1989, primarily as a
response to the activities of a white supremacist group, the Australian
Nationalist Movement. At the time ANM was responsible for a racist poster
and graffiti campaign, along with related acts of vandalism and intimidation.
The legislation was never used against ANM (although members of ANM
were prosecuted for a range of criminal offences in 19907).
Section 26 of the Queenisland Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 provides
limited protection against expressions of racial hatred. It states:
A person must not, by advocating racial or religious hatred or
hostility, incite unlawful discrimination or another contravention
of the Act.
Little use has been made of the racial hatred laws of Western Australia,
Queensland, and the Australian Capital Territory (where the Discrimination
Act 1991 contains provisions which mirror the racial vilification provisions of
the New South Wales legislation). 8
The Commonwealth Racial Hatred Act 1995
Much of the recent debate in Australia over the merits of racial hatred
laws has been conducted around the edges of the emergence of national
legislation - a tortured process which culminated in the passage of the Racial
Hatred Act 1995 (Cth) in September 1995. In its final form the legislation is
considerably narrower than when the Racial Hatred Bill was first tabled in
Parliament late in 1994 with the aim of creating both criminal offences and a
ground of human rights complaint. As a result of amendments introduced by
See also, Criminal Code 1913 (WA), ss.78-80.
7 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Racist Violence: Report of
National Inquiry into Racist Violence in Australia (Canberra: Australian Government
Publishing Service, 1991) ("NIRV Report") at 200.
Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT), ss.66-67.
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the Greens in the Senate, the provisions which would have added three new
offences to the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) were deleted from the legislation. 9 The
main effect of the Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth) is the addition of "Part ILA -
Prohibition of Offensive Behaviour Based on Racial Hatred" to the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).
Section 18C(l) of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) now states:
It is unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise than in private,
if:
(a) the act is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to offend,
insult, huniliate or intimidate another person or a group of
people; and
(b) the act is done because of the race, colour or national or ethnic
origin of the other person or of some or all of the people in the
group.
The section applies to public conduct, although the fact that this is
expressed in the negative ("otherwise than in private") suggests that the scope
of the legislation is to be interpreted quite broadly.' 0 Section 18B provides
that race, colour, or national or ethnic origin need not be the only reason or
even the dominant reason for the respondent's conduct, although it must be a
substantial reason. I
Section 18D specifies a number of exemptions from the operation of the
legislation, providing that "Section 18C does not render unlawful anything
Two of the criminal offences would have prohibited specific threats to person
(maximum penalty: 2 years imprisonment) and threats to property (maximum penalty:
1 year imprisonment), where motivated by the race, colour or national or ethnic origin
of the person or persons threatened. The third, and most controversial, amendment to
the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) would have been the addition of the offence of intentionally
inciting racial hatred.
This interpretation is supported by the terns of subsections (2) and (3), which
elaborate on the meaning of "otherwise than in private" and "public place".
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), s. 18B.
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said or done reasonably and in good faith" in artistic works, for genuine
academic, artistic, scientific or public interest purposes, and in
making/publishing either fair and accurate reports of events of public interest
or comments on matters of public interest which are the expression of a
genuine belief. Complaints can be made to the Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission for conciliation/adjudication. 12
It is obviously too soon to offer any comment about the practical operation
of this most recent addition to the list of racial hatred laws in Australia.
However, two observations can be made. The most obvious is that for the
first time, racial vilification is the subject of national legislation, allowing all
victims of racial vilification, regardless of state or territory of residence, the
opportunity to seek redress in a human rights forum. The second observation,
is that while the Racial Hatred Act 1995 may be seen by some as a watered-
down version of the laws originally proposed (because of the failure of the
legislation to provide for criminal prosecutions) this 'short-coming' may,
whatever its symbolic importance, be insignificant in practical terms. The
New South Wales experience, discussed below, suggests that in terms of
offering an effective response to the needs of victims of racial vilification
criminal laws and formal prosecutions run a distant second to human rights
laws and conciliation-based proceedings.
Racial Vilification Laws in NSW
The statutory provisions which provide the most useful reference point for
an examination of the practical operation of racial vilification laws are those
contained in the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Act 1977. In 1989 the
Act was amended13 to allow for the making of complaints of racial
vilification to the Anti-Discrimination Board. Under section 20C(l):
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), s.22. For a critical commentary on the original
Racial Hatred Bill 1994 (which was substantially amended before being enacted as
the Racial Hatred Act 1995) see K. Eastman, "Drafting Vilification Laws: Legal and
Policy Issues" (1994) 1 Australian Journal of Human Rights 285.
Anti-Discrimination (Racial Vilification) Amendment Act 1989 (NSW).
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It is unlawful for a person, by a public act, to incite hatred
towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or
group of persons on the ground of the race of the person or
members of the group.
Subsection 20C(2) provides for certain exceptions including fair reporting,
absolute privilege and acts done in good faith or in the public interest.
Under section 20D the act of vilification will be a criminal offence if the
means adopted include:
(a) threatening physical harm towards, or towards any property
of, the person or group of persons, or
(b) inciting others to threaten physical harm towards, or towards
the property of, the person or group of persons.
No person will be prosecuted without the consent of the Attorney General.' 4
During the second reading speech in the Legislative Council at the time of
the original introduction of racial vilification provisions in 1989 Ted
Pickering (then Minister for Police and Emergency Services) noted that:
... the issue of racial vilification or incitement to racial hatred has
been the concern of successive governments and has been the
subject of debate in this State and in the federal sphere for more
than a decade.
1 5
Since the racial vilification amendments to the Anti-Discrimination Act
came into force in October 1989, a substantial number of complaints have
been formally received and handled by the New South Wales Anti-
Discrimination Board. Between October 1989 and 30 June 1994 the Anti-
Discrimination Board received 442 formal complaints of racial vilification. A
large proportion of complaints are made against the media (print, television,
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s.20D(2).
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, 10 May 1989, at 7810-
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radio). For example, of the 113 complaints lodged in 1992/93 52% fell into
this category. In 1993/94 the proportion of racial vilification cases which
involved the media was 49%.
When considering the number of complaints which have been lodged under
the racial vilification provisions, it is important to recognise a distinctive
feature of the New South Wales experience: the vast majority of matters
handled by the Anti-Discrimination Board have been dealt with by informal
negotiation and private conciliation. To date there have been only two racial
vilification complaint adjudicated by the New South Wales Equal
Opportunity Tribunal. 16 There have been no criminal prosecutions for serious
racial vilification under section 20(D) of the Act. Four matters have been
referred to the Attorney General, but the Director of Public Prosecutions has
decided not to prosecute in any of these cases.
1 7
One corsequence of the emphasis on conciliation in the handling of racial
vilification complaints which has had particular implications for the policy
debate over racial hatred laws, is that the nature of the proceedings is such
that little information is currently available about the way Australia's most
,active' racial vilification laws are working. The absence of conventional hard
legal data in the forin of judicial or quasi-judicial decisions helps explain (but
does not justify) the superficial and abstract debate on racial hatred laws
which has taken place in recent times. Consideration of the information which
is available (contained in Anti-Discrimination Board Annual Reports,
legislation review reports, and decisions of the Equal Opportunity Tribunal)
Harou-Sourdon v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1994) EOC 92-604; and Wagga Wagga
Aboriginal Action Group v Eldridge (1995) EOC 92-701. Several matters are
currently listed for hearing by the EOT: see below n.23.
NSW Anti-Discrimination Board, Balancing the Act: A Submission to the NSW Law
Reform Coromission's Review, of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), Sydney,
ADB, May 1994 at 54.
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and analysis of data which is currently being compiled,' 8 has the potential to
inform a more constructive debate over the merits of racial hatred laws. 19
It was noted earlier that only two racial vilification matters have been
decided by the Equal Opportunity Tribunal. Though small in number, these
decided cases, shed some useful light on the practical operation of racial
hatred laws.
In Harou-Sourdon v TCN Channel Nine Pty Lt120 the Equal Opportunity
Tribunal considered a complaint based on comments by Clive Robertson
during a television program in 1990 which were alleged to constitute racial
vilification of persons of French origin. The complaint was dismissed under
section 111(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) on the basis that
it was misconceived and lacking in substance. Perhaps the primary
significance of the decision is that it has helped to allay fears that the racial
vilification provisions would be 'abused' and extended to conduct with which
the law was not designed to deal.
In Wagga Wagga Aboriginal Action Group v Eldridge2' the Equal
Opportunity Tribunal adjudicated on several complaints against a Wagga
Wagga City Councillor, Jim Eldridge. On at least two occasions in June
1993, Eldridge had, at public events, including the local launch of the United
Nations International Year for the World's Indigenous People, made
comments which were considered to amount to vilification of Aboriginal
persons. Eldridge was ordered to: refrain from continuing or repeating any
unlawful conduct under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977; publish an
apology; and pay $3000 damages. In the course of its decision the Tribunal
The author is currently completing an empirical study of racial vilification complaints
handled by the ADB over a two year period (May 1993--April 1995).
19 For a brief discussion of the racial vilification complaint handling process, see N.
Hennessy and P. Smith, "Have We Got It Right'? NSW Racial Vilification Laws Five
Years On" (1994) 1 Australian Journal of Human Rights 249 at 258-63.
21) (1994) EOC 92-604.
21 (1995) EOC 92-701.
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rejected the respondent's arguments that section 20C of the Anti-
)iscrimination Act 1977 should he considered invalid on the basis that it
derogated from the right to free speech. It held that "free speech" was not a
defence to an action under section 2)C. The Tribunal noted that the racial
vilification legislation had been drafted so as to avoid the likeliholod of
interference with freedom of expression, and that, in any event, the right to
free expression "has never been an absolute or unequivocal right."122
The number of cases which are moving beyond conciliation, to be formally
adjudicated upon by the Equal Opportunity Tribunal, is increasing. Between
May 1993 and April 1995 nine matters were referred to the Equal
Opportunity Tribunal. 23 These decisions will be important in continuing to
give shape to the sphere of operation of the racial vilification provisions of the
New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, and of Australian racial
hatred laws generally.
The New South Wales experience offers a valuable reference point for the
broader debate over racial hatred laws in Australia. The New South Wales
racial vilification laws are not perfect, and various changes have been made
and proposed. 24 However, after five years of operation, two conclusions can
be made. First, the proscription of the public incitement of racial hatred in
New South Wales has not destabilised the foundations of Australian
democracy. The 'doom and gloom' prophesies with which some
commentators greeted the introduction of racial vilification laws in 198925
have simply not been fulfilled. As Rubenstein and Kapel have concluded:
Ibid at 78,266. For further discussion of this case, see L. McNamara, "Confronting the
Reality of Hate Speech" (1995) 20(5) Alternative Law Journal 232.
Preliminary data, on file with the author.
For a discussion of specific issues still in need ot attention, see NSW Anti-
Discrimination Board, above n. 17 at 49-57.
See, for example, the 1989 discussion of the "likely consequences" of the racial
vilification amendments by T.Katsigiannis, "How the NSW Anti-Discrimination Laws
Threaten Free Speech", Policy, 1989 (Summer), at 29-30.
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The media in NSW has survived without undue restriction.
Political, social and intellectual debate have not been stifled or
curtailed. It is not illegal in NSW to be racist. It is illegal to incite
individuals to attack others because of their ethnicity or
nationality.
26
Second, racial hatred legislation - when based on a human rights model of
complaint, negotiation, conciliation and, when necessary, adjudication - offers
a valuable mechanism for addressing the very real harms suffered by victims
of racial vilification. More specifically, when compared with other forms of
racial hatred laws - such as criminal laws or laws which provide for civil
proceedings - conciliation-based human rights laws appear to be the most
effective form of regulatory legal intervention. That is, while commonly
perceived as the 'soft option', human rights law may actually represent a
more effective response to the problem of racial vilification than the 'serious
business' of criminal prosecution or civil proceedings.
This assessment is not the result of a prioritising of individual free speech
'rights', nor of a commitment to supporting that form of legal intervention
which is considered to be least 'threatening' to free speech. On the contrary,
the central argument of this article, developed further in Part III, is that a
constructive debate in Australia over the merits of racial hatred laws must
transcend the current preoccupation with 'free speech' which is constraining,
misleading and counterproductive. Rather, it is the result of an application of
the following bottom-line criterion: which forms of racial hatred laws, in
practice, work best for victims or potential victims of racial vilification in
practice? Part IV will elaborate on the reasons why the best answer to this
question is: conciliation-based human rights law.
C.Rubenstein & M.Kapel, "Racial Vilification Bill is a crucial test for the Coalition",
The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 November 1994, 13.
HeinOnline  -- 4 Griffith L. Rev. 39 1995
Griffith Law Review (1995) Vol.4 No.1
III. Free Speech and Opposition to Racial Hatred Laws
The vigour and regularity with which criticisms have been levelled at
racial hatred laws in the name of 'free speech' has not often, unfortunately,
been matched by rigorous and thorough analysis of the alleged 'threat'. The
persuasiveness of civil libertarian/free speech-based opposition to racial
hatred laws in Australia - voiced loudly and regularly in the popular media in
tie lead-up to the enactment of the Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth) - is
diminished by a number of fundamental flaws.
This section of the article will address a number of these weaknesses, with
particular emphasis on contributions to the debate which have misrepresented
the need for, and distorted the nature and likely impact of, racial hatred laws.
It is by no means suggested that the views of all civil libertarian opponents of
racial hatred laws are flawed in each of the ways discussed here. Nor is it
asserted that liberalism has nothing to offer an effective analysis of the merits
of racial hatred laws. Rather, the specific issues addressed here are presented
as illustrative of the fundamental inadequacy of a narrowly focused liberal,
individual rights-based critique. It is imperative that the adoption of various
forms of legal regulation in response to harmful manifestations of racism
which are not otherwise addressed by existing legal measures be assessed in a
comprehensive and contextual fashion. This assessment must draw on a wider
range of critical perspectives, including contributions from Critical Race
Theory (CRT). A reorganisation of the parameters of the debate along these
lines will support a more fruitful examination of the promises and pitfalls of
racial hatred laws, based on genuine inclusion of the necessary perspectives of
victims of racial vilification.
27
1. Questioning the existence of the problem
The most obvious flaw in much free speech-based opposition to racial
hatred laws - particularly views expressed in the popular press - is the
27
M.J.Matsuda, "Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story"
(1989) 87 Michigan Law Review 2320.
HeinOnline  -- 4 Griffith L. Rev. 40 1995
The Merits of Racial Hatred Laws: Beyond Free Speech
tendency to down-play the level of racial violence and expressed racial hatred
in Australia, and a failure to recognise the harm caused to racial, ethnic and
religious minorities by such conduct. For example, former Labor Senator
John Button, has stated, "I worry about the proposed racial vilification
legislation. I worry about the need for it, and whether, in fact, it may be
counter-productive." 2 8 Similarly, shortly after the release of the Racial
Hatred Bill in November 1994, Frank Devine, regular columnist for The
Australian concluded, with little elaboration, that "No need for the legislation
has been demonstrated."
29
Either such comments either reflect disturbing naivety and ignorance, or a
number of recent inquiries (including the National Inquiry into Racist
Violence in Australia, 30 the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in
Custody, 3 1 and the Australian Law Reform Commission Reference on
Multiculturalism and the Law32) have simply got it wrong. The latter is
unlikely.
It is true that the prevalence of conduct which expresses or otherwise
incites racial hatred is difficult to measure. However, there is substantial
evidence in Australia that racial vilification is more than a marginal
phenomenon of the ultra right fringe, and causes considerable harm to various
groups in society. The 1991 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission's National Inquiry into Racist Violence - the NIRV Report -
documented a disturbing level of racist intimidation, harassment and attacks.
The Inquiry received 1447 reports of racially motivated acts of violence or
28 J.Button, "When banter crosses the border of the vilification bill", The Sydney
Morning Herald, 5 September 1994, 13.
F.Devine, "Divisive racial hatred bill an insult to us all", The Australian, 14
November 1994, 11.
Above n.7.
31 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National Report, Canberra,
AGPS, 1991.
32 Law Reform Commission, Multiculturalism and the Law, Canberra, AGPS, 1991.
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harassment, 33 although Rubenstein has argued that, "It is clear that this is
only a fraction of the incidents actually occurring. ' 34 The NIRV Report found
that "Racist violence is an endemic problem for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people in all Australian States and Territories. '35 It also found that
"Racist violence on the basis of ethnic identity in Australia is nowhere near
the level that it is in many other countries. Nonetheless it exists at a level that
causes concern and it could increase in intensity and extent unless addressed
now."
3 6
A specific study undertaken for the NIRV in the Sydney suburbs of
Campbelltown and Marrickville found "a level of racist violence, which while
not as high or as violent as that found in other English speaking countries, is
nevertheless more than can be explained by the activity of a few extremist
groups or disturbed individuals."
37
Very little of the available information reveals the prevalence of conduct
amounting to racial vilification which does not involve violence. The
justification for relying on data on racist violence is that evidence of the more
serious conduct provides an indication as to the (presumably higher) level of
'pre-violence conduct' at which racial vilification or hate propaganda laws
are specifically directed. Certainly, one of the strongest arguments in favour
of prohibiting public expressions of racial hatred is that such conduct either
directly encourages, or otherwise increases the likelihood of, racially
motivated violence. However, as Critical Race scholars have argued very
NIRV Report, above n.7 at 170.
34 C.Ruhenstein, "Legislating an end t- racism", The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May
1995, 13. Rubenstein refers to a recent Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and
Population Research study which "found that almost three-quarters of a surveyed
group of overseas students had encountered prejudice and discrimination when in
Australia undergoing university training."
NIRV Report, above n.7 at 387.
Ibid.
P.Newell, Migrant Experience of Racist Violence: A Study of Households in
Campbelltown & Marrickville, Sydney, NIRV, HREOC, 1990 at 36.
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effectively, racial vilification is itself harniful, 38 and the case in favour of
legal regulation is not contingent on establislimg a causal link between racial
vilification and physical violence. 39
Evidence such as that contained in NIRV Report supports the conclusion,
as Rubenstein has expressed it, that "Racial violence and hatred against
minority groups is not as uncommon as many might believe and destroys the
quality of life for Australians who are victims. '- 40 References to the 'fact' that
Australia is basically a very tolerant society - another feature of opposition to
racial hatred laws - do little to address this reality.
2. Ignoring the evidence on the operation of racial hatred laws
Many contributors to the debate over racial hatred laws have conveniently
ignored, grossly misrepresented or selectively cited relevant experience. In
particular, little attention has been paid to the operation of the New South
Wales Anti-Discrimination Act's racial vilification provisions over the past 6
years.
In an article critical of the proposed Racial Hatred Bill 1994, Ron Merkel
made two comments which are indicative of this tendency. At one point in the
article he observed that "Conciliation, education and counselling mechanisms
rather than unlawful conduct are a preferable course. "'41 Later he concluded
that "The legislative path against racial vilification has not been shown to be
successful elsewhere and there is no reason to believe that it will be any more
successful in Australia." 42 These comments assume (wrongly) that
conciliation and legislation are mutually exclusive. In fact, as noted above, the
38 See discussion below nn.59-66.
39 M.Jones, "Empowering Victims of Racial Hatred by Outlawing Spirit-Murder" (1994)
1 Australian Journal of Human Rights 299 at 319-20.
.4)
Above n. 3 4.
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most distinctive feature of the model of legal intervention employed in New
South Wales since 1989 has been a strong preference for the use of
conciliation and counselling mechanisms in relation to complaints of racial
vilification.
3. Misplaced criteria for assessing effectiveness and the over-
generalisation of form
On the occasions when existing Australian racial vilification laws are
considered there is a tendency to use irrelevant or inappropriate barometers of
the effectiveness of legal intervention, and to fail to distinguish between
different forms of legal intervention.
When Frank Brenan - widely respected for his support of Indigenous
social justice issues - voiced his opposition to criminal racial hatred laws in
1994, an editorial in The Australian advised the Government to sit up and
take notice. While Brennan's views do warrant serious attention his argument
against criminal racial hatred laws has at least one major weakness. A major
theme of Brennan's argument was that "The criminal law is a blunt
instrument for reshaping the hearts of racists." 4 3 This may well be true, but
the realisation in itself does little to weaken the case for legal intervention.
While the sort of attitudinal transformation to which Brennan refers would be
a desirable outcome of legal sanctions, it is hardly the primary reason for the
existence of racial hatred laws. Racial vilification laws must be seen primarily
as an opportunity for victims and target groups to seek protection from the
harm caused by such conduct and as a means of establishing and regulating
standards of acceptable behaviour. The words of Martin Luther King,
recently evoked by Rubenstein in defence of the Racial Hatred Bill 1994, are
apposite: "Morality cannot be legislated but behaviour can be regulated.
Judicial decrees may not change the heart but they restrain the heartless.
44
41 F.Brennan, "Law won't soften the hearts of racists", The Australian, 12 August 1994,
13.
44 Cited in C.Rubenstein, above n.34.
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The regularity with which critics of racial hatred laws lump together all
forms of legal intervention without distinction is another indication of the
vague and abstract nature of the debate and of its misplaced theoretical focus.
For example, in a 'comment' on the Racial Hatred Bill in 1994 radio
announcer and newspaper columnist Mike Carlton gave the grossly
misleading impression that "you can apparently be packed off to jail for
waving a fist at someone and calling him or her a Wog...' 45 Nothing in the
Racial Hatred Bill suggested that the conduct referred to would be
criminalised by the legislation, but the distortion was employed as a means of
dismissing the proposed legislation and ignoring the conduct with which the
various provisions of the Act would be concerned. No distinction was made
between conduct which it was proposed would provide the basis for a
complaint to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Comnission and
conduct which might (as originally proposed in the bill) have resulted in
criminal prosecution. The scope of the proposed legislation was seriously
misrepresented.
Ian Freckleton's contribution to a recent "Symposium on Racial
Vilification" published in the Australian Journal of Human Rights is
evidence that analysis from a civil libertarian perspective need not be abstract
or superficial. One need not be persuaded by Freckleton's conclusion that
"racial hatred legislation is not the answer"46 to acknowledge that his is a
well-considered critique of racial vilification laws. However, Freckleton's
argument suffers too from a failure to adequately distinguish between
crimninal law and human rights law. His discussion of the specific provisions
of the Racial Hatred Bill47 is typical of the tendency to confuse the issues -
M.Carlton. "Lawyers join angels shock", The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 November
1994, 40.
I.Freckleton, "Censorship and Vilification Legislation" (1994) 1 Australian Journal of
Human Rights 327 at 352.
lbid at 349-50.
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including the nature of the 'threat' to 'free speech' - raised by human rights
proceedings and criminal prosecutions respectively.
4. Asserting that the answer is 'more speech'
This assumed tolerance provides an important element in the shaky
foundation of another argument commonly advanced from the perspective of
free speech advocacy: it is preferable to 'get things out in the open' than to
seek to prevent the public expressions of racial hatred with legislation.
Katsigiannis has expressed the view in the following terms: "The better way
to deal with dangerous or socially inacceptable material is to have it exposed
to the public view for the danger that it really is." '48
The flaw in this argument is that it relies heavily on the ability and
willingness of free-thinking individuals to engage in a process of listening,
digesting, analysing and rejecting expressions of racial hatred. It assumes that
such views will be condemned and dismissed because they are easily
recognised as abhorrent and unacceptable mad because they bear no relation
to widely held sentiments. It ignores lx)th the overwhelming evidence that
racism has been an endemic feature of Australia's history, and the various
indications that racism is still very much prevalent in Australian society. Even
if it is accepted that Australia has become a more tolerant society, the fact
remains, as one high profile opponent of racial hatred laws has conceded, that
"there is a hardcore of good old-fashioned racism that endures, that survives
and thrives."4 9
In the course of an attack on the Racial Hatred Bill 1994 one
commentator asked the following question, "What grounds does the
Government have for its insolent assumption that Australians would be
seduced by, rather than contemptuously reject, racist propaganda?" To pose
T.Katsigiannis, Free Speech Committee, Letter to the Editor, The Sydney Morning
Herald, 23 May 1995, at 12. See also T.Katsigiannis, above n.25.
49 P.Adams, "The Role of the Media" (1995) 8 Without Prejudice 47 at 52 (Special
Report: Proceedings of the National Conference-Without Prejudice: Racism and
Antisernitism in Contemporary Australia, 11-12 June 1994).
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such a question is to ignore the readily available evidence - historical and
contemporary - of how close to the surface the core of racism is found in
Australia. The treatment metered out to many Australians of French descent
and French-speaking visitors in the wake of the recent announcement by the
French Government of the recommencement of nuclear weapons testing in the
South Pacific is only the most recent example. 50
The corollary of the view that expressions of racial hatred should not be
'forced underground' (why this would be undesirable is rarely articulated in a
satisfactory manner - certainly the harm to target groups would be minimised)
is that hate speech should be countered with more speech rather than
regulation. For example, Phillip Adams has argued that the best response to
expressions of racial hatred is "public debate, not legal censure. It is better to
join battle than to bottle up, better to convert than to censor." 51 One must ask
- better for whom'? Can it really be said that this approach is 'better' for
victims of racial vilification, particularly where the offending conduct is not
sufficiently 'high profile' (by virtue of who said it, where it was said, or
whether it was reported) to generate public condenmation or a counter-view.
This approach may work well in the context of newsworthy events such as
racist slurs on the professional sporting field, but it does little to address the
more 'mundane', and much more frequent incidents of racial vilification
which occur in our society.52 The 'more speech' argument fails to recognise
that victims of such conduct, even if inclined to respond, are unlikely to enjoy
the same access to the means of 'being heard' as their vilifiers.
See D.Lewis, "It's racial hatred, say French-Australians", The Sydney Morning
Herald, 19 June 1995, 1.
51 Above n.49 at 48.
52 For a critique of the paternalism which underlies what they term the "talk back"
argument, see R.Delgado and D.H.Yun, "Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An
Analysis of Paternalistic ()bjections to Hate Speech Regulation" (1994) 82 California
LawReview 871 at 883-96.
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5. Reliance on the rhetoric of an absolute right to free expression
The notion of a constitutionally protected 'right' to freedom of expression is
in its infancy in Australia. In a series of decisions in 1992-9453 the High
Court of Australia held that, implicit in the Constitution, is a fight to freedom
of communication in relation to political discourse. Despite this development,
the current legal position remains, as Freckleton has observed, that:
There is in Australia no such thing as a right to freedom of
speech. What may lawfully be said is simply what remains after
criminal and civil preclusions upon what may be said in public.
The discourse cannot particularly usefully be put in terms of
rights and liberties except to the extent that the starting point is
that persons may say what they wish unless it falls foul of
criminal or civil preclusion. Many preclusions exist, including
civil and criminal libel laws; obscenity and indecency laws;
restrictions upon what may be said on the telephone and what
may be sent through the mail; the existence of criminal laws
preventing the making of threats to kill or injure; using
threatening, abusive or insulting words at a public meeting, the
making of racist statements on the media and so on. In fact an
enormous array of legislation regulates what may and may not be
said.
54
Despite this, many commentators, particularly those with access to mass
media outlets, have been happy to draw on the rhetoric of absolute fights in
order to question the legitimacy of laws designed to provide protection from
harassment, abuse and vilification on the basis of race. Too frequently it is
simply assumed that: Australians have a 'right' to free speech (in terms
equivalent to the protection afforded by the First Amendment in the United
53 See Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106;
Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 108 ALR 68; Theophanous v. Herald &
Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 1; Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd
(1994) 124 ALR 80; and Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994) 124 ALR 120.
54 I.Freckletun, above n.46 at 334-35.
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States); there is a 'clash' between this 'right' and the regulation of racial
vilification; and the resulting infringement of 'free speech' represents a
serious threat to the Australian democracy. Given the substantial number of
'infringements' under which 'free speech' already labours in this country,
opposition to racial hatred laws in such terms suggests that the need to offer
protection to victims of racial vilification ranks low on the list of important
social objectives. As Rubenstein and Kapel have commented:
There appear to be distorted priorities when we have laws to
prevent spitting and offensive behaviour, but an outcry when we
similarly legislate to protect individuals who are threatened,
humiliated and physically attacked because they may be
Aboriginal, Asian, Jewish or Arab.55
Ron Castan has commented on the tendency of "highly principled" free
speech advocates to lose sight of the victims of racial hatred. 56 Nguyen Trieu
Dan has similarly observed that, "Strangely, much of the debate in the press
on the racial vilification legislation does not centre on the victims of
racism." 57 The reality of racial vilification and racist violence in Australia - as
revealed in the NIRV Report58 - requires a more thoroughly analysed and
well-considered response. The debate over the legitimacy of racial hatred laws
must consider the perspective of victims and target groups.
Achieving this inclusion has been the primary objective of the Critical
Race Theory (CRT) movement in the United States. CRT has been described
as a movement which combines "the methods of Critical Legal Studies (CLS)
with the political commitments of 'traditional civil fights scholarship' in a
way that would both revitalize legal scholarship on race and correct the
55 C.Rubenstein and M.Kapel, above n.26.
R.Castan, "Targets of race hate entitled to redress", The Australian, 15 November
1994, 17.
57 N.T.Dan, "Shift focus of race hate debate to victims, The Australian, 3 November
1994, 9.
58 Above n.7.
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deconstructive excesses of CLS."'59 CRT scholars including Patricia
Williams, Richard Delgado, Mari Matsuda and Derrick Bell, have produced a
substantial and impressive body of literature60 which has added an extremely
valuable dimension to the analysis of race, racism and law.
Critical race theorists have engaged powerfully in the ongoing debate in
the USA over the legitimacy and constitutionality of regulating hate speech. 6
1
Critical race theorists have highlighted the need to address and take seriously
the very real harm caused by public expressions of racial hatred. The extent
of the harm caused by hate speech and other forms of racism has been
captured by Patricia Williams in the tern "spirit-murder". 62  Williams
describes racism as:
... an offense so deeply painful and assaultive as to constitute
something I call "spirit-murder". Society is only beginning to
recognise that racism is as devastating, as costly, and as
physically obliterating as robber or assault; indeed they are often
the saune thing. Racism resembles other offenses against
humanity whose structures are so deeply embedded in culture as
to prove extremely resistant to being recognised as fonns of
oppression.
6 3
In bringing this necessary perspective to the debate over the regulation of
hate speech, CRT scholars have drawn effectively on the critical methodology
59 A.P.Harris, "Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Recontsruction" (1994) 82 California
Law Review 741.
See R.Delgado and J.Stefancic, "Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography"
(1993) 79 Virginia Law Review 461.
hi See, for example, M.Matsuda et al., Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory,
Assaultitative Speech, and the First Amendment, Boulder, Westview Press, 1993; and
L.Lederer and R.Delgado (eds), The Price We Pay: The Case Against Racist Speech,
Hate Propaganda and Pornography, New York, Faura, Strauss and Giroux, 1995.
62 P.Williams, "Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the
Law's Response to Racism" (1987) 42 University of Miami Law Review 127.
6 I
Ibid at 129.
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of narrative or story-telling 64 and the creation of what has been described as
"outsider jurisprudence". 65
The compelling case for the inclusion of this perspective - routinely
ignored or marginalised by liberal accounts of free speech - has been
expressed by Australian scholar Melinda Jones in the following terms:
The victim is not interested in abstract theory nor philosophical
meanderings. The victim is not concerned with applications of
neutral principles nor with timeless norms. The victim bases her
analysis on harsh reality: the concrete current and historical
experience of oppression, the exclusion, the reduced status, the
effect of not being perceived as a person but as a derogatory
stereotype.
66
Listening to victims and taking the harm of racial vilification seriously is
not an exercise in anti-intellectualism. As CRT scholars have demonstrated so
effectively, endorsing such an approach provides the foundation for an
analysis which is grounded in experience, and every bit as intellectually
rigorous as 'conventional' jurisprudential discourses. It involves recognising
the legitimacy of alternative and competing perspectives, which have the
potential to offer a persuasive challenge to the hegemony of liberal discourse,
and to add a vital dimension to the debate over racial hatred laws.
Recognising the fundamental importance of victim perspective requires an
engagement which goes beyond the bounds of the for/against debate
concerning legal regulation of racial vilification; it involves participating in a
search for the most effective form(s) of legal regulation. In the last part of this
article I will briefly examine the relative merits of alternative forms of legal
intervention. Specifically, I discuss why racial hatred laws based on the
conciliation-based human rights model, despite substantial flaws, still appear
tA For an introduction to the legal methodology of story-telling, see "Symposium: Legal
Storytelling" (1989) 87 Michigan La' Review 2073.
65 See M.J.Matsuda, above n.27 at 2323-26.
M.Jones, above n.39 at 302.
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to offer victims of racial vilification the greatest prospect of a satisfactory
form of legal redress.
IV. Conciliation - the Best Alternative?
Assessed from the point of view of practical effectiveness, the human
rights model of racial vilification laws has significant advantages when
compared with commonly identified alternative forms of legal intervention,
including criminal law. I have argued elsewhere that criminal racial hatred
laws may be unacceptable, not because this form of legal intervention
unjustifiably infringes individual ights, but because, in practice, by virtue of
major barriers to prosecutions ever being commenced (let alone successfully
completed) reliance on the criminal justice system may be seriously
inadequate as an effective response to the realities of the intimidation,
harassment, ridicule and vilification suffered by individuals and groups on the
basis of actual or perceived racial or ethno-religious identity.
67
This conclusion is supported by an examination of the operation of
criminal hate propaganda laws in Canada since being introduced in 1970.68
The Canadian experience illustrates that the nature of criminal law (including
substantive provisions and the processes of criminal justice) in countries such
as Canada and Australia is such that it offers very little to victims of racial
vilification in the way of an effective legal response. Specifically, criminal
racial hatred laws are only ever likely to be mobilised (whether successfully
or unsuccessfully) in response to those forms of extreme hate propaganda
For an elaboration oif this position see L. McNamara, "Criminalising Racial Hatred:
Learning trom the Canadian Experience" (1994) 1 Australian Journal of Human
Rights 198 at 205-209.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss.318-19. This experience is paralled in New
South experience where, to date, no criminal prosecutions have been commenced
under s. 20D of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW): see above n. 17.
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associated with the activities of organised white-supremacist groups. 69 The
fact remains that although such extremist activity may fuel (and be fuelled by)
widely held racist sentiments in society, it is largely peripheral to the more
common and insidious forms of racial vilification which are encountered on a
daily basis.
Other possible forms of legal intervention include the extension of existing
tort law relating to the intentional infliction of emotional distress so as to
allow victims of racial insults, slurs and epithets to recover, 70  and the
creation of a new statutory tort action.71 Tort law (based on existing common
law principle or as modified by statute) might provide a satisfactory outcome
for a very small number of victims of (very serious) racial vilification, but it
can offer very little to the majority of those who suffer harm as a result of the
expression and incitement of racial hatred. As with criminal law, formal civil
actions can only ever operate at the margins of the problem. The positions of
inequality which may compromise the effectiveness of a conciliation-based
approach are likely to be even more pronounced and disadvantageous to
Clearly, a conciliation-based process would be inappropriate in such circumstances.
However, it should be noted that the human rights model is not based entirely on
conciliation, but includes the option of quasi-judicial adjudication where conciliation
is unsuccessful or inappropriate.
70 See, for example, Okianer Christian Dark, "Racial Insults: 'Keep Thy Tongue From
Evil"' (1990) 24 Suffolk University Law Review 559; and J.C.Love, "Discriminatory
Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress" (1990) 47
Washington & Lee Latw Review 23.
See the proposal from leading CRT scholar Richard Delgado in "Words that Wound: A
Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling" (1982) 17 Harvard Civil
Liberties-Civil Rights Law Review 133. An example of this approach is the Civil
Rights Protection Act, S.B.C. 1981, c.12 in the Canadian province of British
Columbia. The legislation created "a tort actionable without proof of damage" which
is defined by section 1(2) as ... any conduct or communication by a person that has as
its purpose interference with the civil rights of a person or class of persons by
promoting (a) hatred or contempt of a person or class of persons, or (b) the superiority
or inferiority of a person or class of persons in cAmparison with another or others, on
the basis of colour, race, religion, ethnic origin or place of origin".
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victims of racial vilification in the context of formal civil proceedings. As
Thornton has noted, one of the strong motivations for increasing reliance on
bureaucratic or ahninistrative forms of legal regulation (such as the human
rights system) has been:
a general degree of dissatisfaction with modes of formal
justice, perceived by litigants to be hostile and alienating. Women
aid minorities have remained at the periphery of the white,
Anglo-Celtic, male matrix of legal values which are maifested
in the courtroom, together with its often distressing style of cross-
exunination and oppressive discourse.... Furthermore, the cost of
litigation has removed it from the realn of possibility for most
individuals, let alone the poor and the oppressed ...72
The most obvious advantage of the conciliation-based human rights model
is that it substantially increases the potential breadth of the protection
afforded by racial hatred laws, at least when measured by the (admittedly
crude) indicator of 'number of matters handled'. 73 The relative ease with
which a victim of racial vilification can 'ask the law for help' by lodging a
complaint with a human rights agency such as the New South Wales Anti-
Discrimination Board (or following the enactment of the Racial Hatred Act
1995 (Cth), the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission) contrasts
strikingly with other potential forms of legal intervention, such as criminal
law, where the threshold for commencement of a prosecution has been shown
to be prohibitively high.
A system based on confidential conciliation is also inherently more flexible
than other forms of racial hatred laws (such as criminal laws or laws which
provide for civil proceedings) and therefore, more capable of responding to a
wide range of fonis of racial vilification. The nature of the process avoids to
a considerable extent the possibility that a complainant's request for help will
72 M.Thornton, The Liberal Prornise: Anti-Discrimination Legislation in Australia
Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1991 at 145.
73 See the New South Wales figures, discussed above nn.13-26.
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go unanswered because of rigidly specified elements such as are likely to be
crucial to a criminal trial or a tort action.
Reliance on a process based on private conciliation is not without its
problems. Mzny of Margaret Thornton's "equivocations of conciliation" 74 are
as applicable to the handling of racial vilification complaints as to the other
areas of anti-discrimination law with which were her important research was
primarily concerned. For example, the private and confidential nature of the
process whereby, in Thornton's terms, "violations are treated not as public
transgressions in the way that crimes are treated, but as private pecadilloes"
75
seriously inhibits the community education potential of anti-discrimination
laws, including racial vilification laws. Thornton rightly describes as
"excessively optimistic" the view that "each complaint to an appropriate
agency has a positive ripple effect in reducing the overall incidence of
discrimination in the comun-ity."76 Further, Thornton states:
The secrecy surrounding conciliation precludes group
empowerment to a marked degree, ... The outcome of conciliation
is invisible and is perceived to be of relevance to the parties only;
it cannot be used as a model for others, or as a means of
developing a collective lobby to change policy if policy changes
have not resulted as a condition of settlement.
The private nature of the complaint handling process is particularly
difficult to reconcile with racial vilification laws, which by statutory
definition, are concerned with public conduct. In New South Wales the Anti-
Discrimination Board has sought to broaden the impact of racial vilification
laws beyond the boundaries of the individual parties to specific complaints by
means including community awareness strategies, and by incorporating, as
74 M.Thomton, above n.72, ch. 5.
.75 Ibid at 144.
76 Ibid at 147.
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appropriate, community education components into the tenns of settlement of
complaints.
77
Another clear disadvantage of the conciliation model is that it does place a
heavy onus on the aggrieved individual (or a representative organisation) to
initiate the complaint and undertake substantial responsibility for the carriage
of the matter. A variety of factors, including a lack of awareness of the
legislation, language, and physical distance (particularly outside major urban
centres) represent significant access impediments for many victims of racial
vilification. That the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) does not allow for
the self-initiation of complaints/investigations by the President of the Anti-
Discrimination Board has been rightly criticised.78 The capacity for
representative bodies to lodge complaints79 offers only a partial solution to
this significant access problem.
80
Where a complaint is lodged, the most commonly raised concern about
conciliation-based proceedings is that complainants are likely to be
intimidated or otherwise disadvantaged by their relative powerless vis-a-vis
the respondent. While it is clearly part of the role of the human rights agency
and its officers to take steps to realign this "asymmetry", that inequality may
remain part of the environment in which conciliation takes place is a cause for
serious concern. 81 At the same time, to see this 'flaw' as fatal to the very idea
of conciliation in the context of racial vilification overstates the problem. The
criticism may reflect a stereotypical view of the nature of conciliation which
assumes that complainant and respondent are sitting at a table 'sorting the
77 A common example is the publication of an apology or a story about racism by a
newspaper which has been the subject of a complaint. See the examples in Anti-
Discrimination Board of New South Wales, Annual Report 1993-1994, Sydney, ADB,
1994 at 33.
78 See, for example, ADB, above n.17 at 53.
79 Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s.87.
ADB, above n. 17 at 5 3.
81 M.Thomton, above n.72 at 155.
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matter out', with the assistance of a neutral conciliator or mediator. This
scenario is actually played out in only a relatively small proportion of
discrimination matters, and in an even smaller proportion of racial vilification
matters. In a recent empirical study of the use of conciliation in sex
discrimination cases, Hunter and Leonard found that in more than half of the
cases examined no conciliation conference was held 82 Preliminary data from
a study of racial vilification complaints handled by the New South Wales
Anti-Discrimination Board in 1993-95 suggests that it is even less likely that
there will be any meeting between complainant and respondent in racial
vilification matters.
83
These research findings highlight the need to analyse specific practices
rather than to question certain forms of dispute resolution based on
stereotypes or generalisations about what is going on in the name of
'conciliation'. They provide additional support for the observation by
Thornton that:
All the Australian agencies accept that a conference between the
parties is not essential to the conciliation process, ... For the most
part, the conciliation officer acts as a 'go-between', resorting to
telephone, correspondence and personal visit to investigate, to
clarify the facts and to conduct negotiations with an eye to
settlement. Thus 'conciliation' within Australian anti-
discrimination legislation tends to be a generic term which
embraces a wide range of functions and styles at the informal
level.
84
Such evidence on the practical workings of the process certainly does not
completely negate the concerns that have been raised about conciliation. For
example, a power imbalance may impact adversely on complainants even in
82 R.Hunter and A.Leonard, The Outcomes of Conciliation in Sex Discrimination Cases.
Working Paper No. 8, Melbourne, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law,
Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne, August 1995 at 14.
Preliminary data on file with the author.
M.Thornton, above n.7
2 at 157.
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the absence of a person-to-person meeting with the respondent. However, it
does indicate that a useful examination and comparison of various forms of
legal intervention requires that the working models considered are accurately
depicted.
Racial vilification laws based on the human rights model, while far from a
panacea for the various manifestations of underlying and widespread societal
racism, are the most likely form of legal intervention to provide victims with a
means of legal redress. If racial hatred laws are assessed in terms of the
protection afforded to victims of hate-related activity (as it is asserted they
should), as opposed to the size of the political point which is made by their
enactment, then the existing evidence suggests that human rights law - based
on accessible complaint/conciliation proceedings, with determination by a
quasi-judicial tribunal in the minority of cases where formal adjudication is
necessary - should remain the primary form of legal regulation.
V. Conclusion
In the context of an analysis of the 'debate' which surrounded the
enactment in 1993 of homosexual vilification laws in New South Wales 85
Anne Scahill has commented that "the subtext of the public debate [was] not
about free speech but about attitudes to homosexuals." 86 Similarly, some of
the ways in which opposition to racial hatred legislation has been expressed
recently suggest that there is considerable ambivalence in Australia about the
value of genuine cultural pluralism, and considerable doubts about the
desirability of seriously attempting to attune law to the demands of a
culturally diverse society.
This ambivalence is implicit in the elevation of liberal fundamentals such
as 'free speech' above the demands of meaningful multiculturalism. As
Anti-Discritnination (Homosexual Vilification) Amendment Act 1993 (NSW).
A.Scahill, "Can Hate Speech Be Free Speech" (1994) 4 Australasian Gay and Lesbian
Law Journal 1 at 2.
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Solomon has argued, ii countries such as Australia, "redressing the harms of
racism is often perceived as being of less importance than civil libertarian
argmnents in favour of the highest degree of preservation of the right to free
speech even where the speech is harmful to individuals, groups, or society in
general.', 8
7
For all the rhetorical statements about Australia's official
multiculturalism', the narrow preoccupations of the popular discourse on
racial hatred laws serve as a reminder that the undercurrent of racism in
Australia's political psyche still runs strong. Opposition to racial hatred laws,
even when articulated in the 'neutral' language of liberal democratic ideology,
and in particular, via reference to the 'right' of free speech, cannot be
completely detached from this historical legacy and contemporary reality. The
extent to which the current debate can get beyond free speech and seriously
address the merits of racial vilification laws will be a good test of whether
Imulticulturalism' is merely convenient rhetoric or whether it really does have
practical implications for govenment policy and law reform, and the
achievement of social justice in a culturally diverse society.
87 T. SoTlomon, "Problems in Drafting Legislation Against Racist Activities" (1994) 1
Australian Journal of Human Rights 265.
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